Models in Political Economy: Collective Choice, Voting, Elections, Bargaining, and Rebellion

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorOsborne, Martin J.
dc.date.accessioned2025-10-07T04:43:55Z
dc.date.available2025-10-07T04:43:55Z
dc.date.issued2025-09-12
dc.date.updated2025-10-07T04:43:53Z
dc.descriptionPublication status: ACTIVE
dc.description.abstractThis volume explores topics that lie at the core of political economy: collective choice, voting, elections, bargaining, and rebellion. It presents the main formal models used to study the behavior of individuals and groups in political contexts, from choosing public policies and participating as voters and candidates in elections, to staging revolutions. Complete mathematical proofs are provided, to clarify the assumptions and deepen understanding. Part I presents models of collective choice. The main question is whether methods exist for selecting a reasonable compromise when individuals’ preferences differ. Models of voting are studied in Part II. Included are models in which the individuals differ in their preferences as well as ones in which they differ in their information. One chapter considers the implications of individuals having ethical concerns, and another studies a model of sequential voting. Models of electoral competition, under the assumption of various motivations for the candidates, are discussed in Part III. One chapter is devoted to the application of these models to the study of redistributive policy. The book concludes with Part IV, which covers models of bargaining and rebellion. The book offers a rigorous yet accessible foundation for understanding how formal tools can illuminate political phenomena.
dc.description.versionVoR
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0490
dc.identifier.isbn9781805117063
dc.identifier.isbn9781805117070
dc.identifier.isbn9781805117087
dc.identifier.other808410c2-da6d-4952-9229-663081c4d612
dc.identifier.urihttps://thoth-arch.lib.cam.ac.uk/handle/1811/913
dc.languageENG
dc.publisherOpen Book Publishers
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectMAT011000
dc.subjectPOL003000
dc.subjectPOL016000
dc.subjectPOL023000
dc.subjectPOL024000
dc.subjectSOC024000
dc.subjectGPQ
dc.subjectJPH
dc.subjectJPHV
dc.subjectJPQB
dc.subjectKCA
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectPolitics and Sociology
dc.subjectCollective choice
dc.subjectElectoral competition
dc.subjectFormal models
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectPolitical economy
dc.subjectVoting theory
dc.titleModels in Political Economy: Collective Choice, Voting, Elections, Bargaining, and Rebellion
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33
dcterms.accessRightsEmbargo: none

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Thumbnail Image
Name:
808410c2-da6d-4952-9229-663081c4d612.pdf
Size:
5.61 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Published version
Download
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
808410c2-da6d-4952-9229-663081c4d612.json
Size:
67.38 KB
Format:
Unknown data format
Description:
Bibliographic metadata
Download

Collections

Thoth Archiving Network