No Prices No Games!: Four Economic Models

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dc.contributor.authorRichter, Michael
dc.contributor.authorRubinstein, Ariel
dc.date.accessioned2024-12-07T04:46:08Z
dc.date.available2024-12-07T04:46:08Z
dc.date.issued2024-11-13
dc.date.updated2024-12-07T04:46:01Z
dc.descriptionPublication status: ACTIVE
dc.description.abstractWhile current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions: • A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will. • A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden. • A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices. • Systematic biases in agents' preferences. These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically – we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games.
dc.description.versionVoR
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0438
dc.identifier.isbn9781805114581
dc.identifier.isbn9781805114598
dc.identifier.isbn9781805114604
dc.identifier.other76ca6d0b-6539-484b-a2a7-d872e064fdae
dc.identifier.urihttps://thoth-arch.lib.cam.ac.uk/handle/1811/821
dc.languageENG
dc.publisherOpen Book Publishers
dc.rightsEmbargo: none
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectBUS024000
dc.subjectBUS069030
dc.subjectBUS069040
dc.subjectKC
dc.subjectKCA
dc.subjectKCK
dc.subjectHB135
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectTextbooks and Learning Guides
dc.subjectAgents
dc.subjectEconomic Theory
dc.subjectEquilibrium
dc.subjectGames
dc.subjectModels
dc.subjectPrices
dc.titleNo Prices No Games!: Four Economic Models
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33

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